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Abstract 
 
Over 2000 teachers in the state of Washington received reduction-in-force (RIF) notices in the 
past two years.  The authors link data on these RIF notices to a unique dataset that includes 
student, teacher, school, and district variables to determine the factors that predict the 
likelihood of a teacher receiving a RIF notice.  They find a teacher’s seniority is the greatest 
predictor, but (all else equal) teachers with a master’s degree and teachers credentialed in the 
“high-needs areas” of math, science, and special education were less likely to receive a RIF 
notice. Value-added measures of teacher effectiveness can be calculated for a subset of the 
teachers and these show no relationship between effectiveness and the likelihood of receiving a 
RIF notice. Finally, simulations suggest that a very different group of teachers would be targeted 
for layoffs under an effectiveness-based layoff scenario than under the seniority-driven system 
that exists today. 
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Budget cuts have resulted in “the most rampant layoffs of teachers and other government 
employees in decades,” as “72,700 education jobs were eliminated in September (2010) on a 
seasonally adjusted basis.” 
 
-Washington Post and New York Times, October 8, 2010 
 
 
I.  Background 
 
Tough economic times portend tight school budgets, possibly for years to come. Stories abound 
about the staffing cuts that will have to be made today and in the next couple of years, as the 
ripple effects of the economic crisis impact local and state education budgets (Lewin and Dillon 
2010; Westneat 2009; Ellerson 2010). Education is a labor-intensive industry with most districts 
devoting well over 50 percent of expenditures toward teacher compensation.1 Consequently, 
major budget cuts have resulted in the first significant teacher layoffs in recent times (Aversa 
and Rugaber 2010).  In fact, the number of layoffs likely would have been larger over the past 
couple of years in the absence of federal stimulus money (AP 2010).  Moreover, while the 
recently passed Education Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act (widely known as the “Edujobs bill”) 
may save hundreds of thousands of teacher jobs nationwide this year (Klein 2010), education 
budgets do not look like they will be improving in the next couple of years as state-expenditures 
are expected to drop again in 2011 (Adams 2010; Hess and Downs 2010) and many pundits 
expect that this is the last time the federal government will step in to avert widespread teacher 
layoffs (AP 2010).   
 There is a growing body of literature that uses value-added models (VAMs) to identify 
the contribution that individual teachers make toward student learning gains (e.g. Aaronson et 
al.  2007; Goldhaber and Hansen 2010b; McCaffrey et al. 2009), and this literature demonstrates 
                                                        
1 According to the U.S. Department of Education, for instance, in 2005-06 about 54 percent of aggregate 
educational expenditures were devoted to instructional salaries and benefits (U.S. Department of 
Education 2009).  
  2 
that teacher quality is the most important schooling factor influencing student achievement.2  
Estimates suggest, for example, that a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality raises 
student achievement in reading and math by 10 (Rivkin et al. 2005; Rockoff 2004) to 26 (Koedel 
and Betts 2007) percent of a standard deviation .3 Thus, for districts facing the prospect of 
layoffs, determining which teachers are laid off has profound implications for student 
achievement.  This fact has not gone unnoticed as calls to reform teacher layoff policies have 
begun to appear with regularity in newspaper editorials and policy briefs (e.g. Daly and 
Ramanathan 2010; NCTQ 2010; The New Teacher Project 2010). 
In this paper we describe the findings from a study on the factors that predict teacher 
layoffs and present some speculative evidence on the implications of layoff policies on student 
achievement. For the analyses we utilize a unique dataset from Washington State that links 
teachers to schools and students and includes information on those teachers who received 
layoff notices in the 2008-09 and 2009-10 school years. 
We find strong evidence that seniority plays an outsized role in determining the 
teachers who are targeted for layoffs, but it is not the sole factor as teachers who are in high-
needs subjects are less likely to receive a layoff notice than those who are not.   Measures of 
teacher effectiveness, however, appear to be entirely unrelated to which teachers receive layoff 
notices.  Finally, simulations suggest that a very different group of teachers would be targeted 
for layoffs under an effectiveness-based layoff scenario than under the seniority-driven system 
that exists today. 
 
                                                        
2 We use the term “teacher quality” to mean the ability of teachers to contribute in measurable ways to 
student gains on standardized tests, and treat this as synonymous with the terms “teacher performance” 
and “teacher effectiveness”. 
3 Moreover, other estimates (Hanushek 1992) show that the difference between having a very effective 
versus very ineffective teacher can be as much as a full year’s learning growth. 
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II.  Seniority-Based Layoff Policies: Background and Implications 
 
It is a relatively rare event to have teachers laid off because of school budget shortages given 
that per pupil spending has risen every year since 1993 (U.S. Department of Education 2010).4 
But layoffs do on occasion happen, so it is not surprising that the layoff process is addressed in 
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).  And, in the overwhelming majority of these 
agreements, seniority is the determining factor in which teachers are laid off first with “last 
hired, first fired” provisions.  For example, all of the 75 largest school districts in the nation use 
seniority as a factor in layoff decisions, and seniority is the sole factor that determines the order 
of layoffs in over 70 percent of these districts.5  
There are notable examples of districts that do not rely solely on seniority.   Chicago 
Public Schools, for instance, recently changed policies to allow layoffs for untenured teachers 
that are performance-based (judged by principals’ evaluations of teachers) (Rossi 2010)—but 
performance-based exceptions to the seniority-based rule are relatively rare, occurring in only 
20 percent of the 75 largest districts.  The situation in Washington State—the focus of this 
study—looks similar.  A review of the collective bargaining agreements currently operating in 
the ten largest school districts in Washington shows that all use seniority as a basis for 
determining layoffs within certificated categories6, and eight of these districts use seniority as 
the only determinant of which teachers get laid off. 
The use of seniority as a determining factor in layoffs is not unique to public education.  
                                                        
4  In fact, per pupil spending in the United States has increased every year since 1970 with the exceptions 
of 1979-80, 1980-81, 1991-92, and 1992-93, and has more than doubled in that time ($10,041 in 2006-07 
compared to $4489 in 1970-71, as measured in 2007-08 dollars).   
5 These figures are compiled based on information from the NCTQ TR3 database (NCTQ 2009).  Notably, 
however, some of these districts are trying to move away from seniority-based layoffs despite the 
language in collective-bargaining agreements. In addition to Chicago, Los Angeles Unified reached a deal 
to end its “last hired, first fired” layoff policy in October 2010 (Blume and Song 2010). 
6 Certificated categories include teachers (grouped by subject area taught), nurses, speech therapists, and 
any other credentialed employees. 
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In a study of the history of layoffs beginning with railroad employees after the American Civil 
War and continuing with the auto industry in the early 1900s, Lee (2004) finds (as of 1994) that 
88 percent of union contracts specified seniority as a factor in the layoff decision.  The Bureau of 
National Affairs also reports that 46 percent of industries (as of 1989) used seniority as the sole 
factor for layoffs.  Among union contracts, the use of seniority-based layoff provisions varies 
somewhat by industry, though the majority of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
union contracts include these provisions.  For instance, over 90 percent of contracts in the 
manufacture of transportation equipment and communications industries include these 
seniority provisions, but only about 10 percent of contracts in construction specify seniority as a 
factor in layoffs (Bureau of National Affairs 1989).  Nor are seniority rules limited to unionized 
sectors of the economy; in a survey of 429 non-construction and non-agricultural firms, 
Abraham and Medoff (1984) found that 24 percent of non-union hourly workers were subject to 
some sort of written seniority policy regarding layoffs.   
 While much of the empirical focus of economic analysis of employment termination has 
been on its effect on future labor market outcomes, the interest here lies in understanding what 
predicts employment separation in the case of downsizing.  This subset of the literature has 
explored the role of various factors, including discrimination (Wolpin 1992), macroeconomic 
cyclicality (Moser 1986), and institutional structures, such as firm-specific human capital 
(Parsons 1972) and unemployment insurance (Topel 1983), in determining layoffs.  More 
pertinent to the discussion here, there are some studies that look generally at the 
characteristics of workers and firms associated with layoffs.  Farber et al. (1997) provides a 
comprehensive look at differences in job loss rates by gender, age, education, as well as across 
different occupations and industries for US workers.  Farber finds that younger and less 
educated workers tend to have relatively higher rates of job loss.  In terms of industry and 
  5 
occupation, Manufacturing and Laborers had the highest rates of job loss, respectively. 
To our knowledge, there is no research on the determinants of layoffs in education, 
though there is a small body of literature on teacher dismissals. In a recent working paper, Jacob 
(2010) explores the relationships between various teacher, school, and student characteristics 
and teacher dismissal probabilities among non-tenured teachers in the Chicago Public Schools.  
Among others, the findings of the paper include an increased likelihood of dismissal for teachers 
with frequent absences, poorer credentials (measured by competitiveness of the college 
attended, failure on previous certification exams, and highest degree completed), and certain 
demographic characteristics, particularly older and male teachers.  Jacob considers several 
measures of teacher effectiveness as well, including an estimate of the teacher’s value added.  
He finds a statistically significant negative relationship between a teacher’s value added and the 
probability of being dismissed. 
Seniority-based layoff policies that protect those teachers with longer tenure in a 
district are likely to have negative consequences for student achievement for at least three 
reasons. The first is obvious: to achieve a given budget reduction target, school districts would 
need to lay off relatively more junior teachers than senior teachers (as junior teachers have 
lower salaries), meaning that a seniority-based layoff policy will cause class sizes to rise more 
than they otherwise would.7 
The second reason is intuitive, but somewhat less obvious: the most senior teachers, 
protected under a seniority-based system, may not be the most effective teachers. As a result, 
school systems may be forced to cut some of their most promising new talent, rather than 
dismissing teachers who have not demonstrated an ability to raise student achievement, if the 
latter have more seniority in the system.  Boyd et al. (2010) explore the implications of seniority-
                                                        
7 For instance, Roza (2009) calculates that if layoffs are done solely on the basis of seniority, a district 
needing to reduce salary expenditures by 5 percent must instead lay off 7.5 percent of its workforce. 
  6 
based layoffs using data from elementary school teachers in New York City.  In particular, they 
simulate the effect of seniority-based versus effectiveness-based (measured by value-added 
methods) layoffs with the assumption that each meets a targeted budget reduction of 5 percent 
of total teacher salaries.  Consistent with Roza (2009), they find that meeting a budget reduction 
requires terminating about 5 percent of teachers under an effectiveness-based system and 
about 7 percent under a seniority based system (since the teachers laid off earn less), and there 
is little overlap in the teachers who are laid off under each scenario.  Moreover, the typical 
teacher laid off under a value-added system is 26 percent of a standard deviation in student 
achievement less effective than the typical layoff under a seniority-based system.8  Given the 
findings on the impact of teacher effectiveness described in Section I, this implies the 
differential between the two types of layoffs is quite large, over a standard deviation of teacher 
effectiveness. 
A final reason that seniority-based systems would likely have consequential impacts on 
student achievement is that strict adherence to seniority would require at least some districts to 
lay off teachers in high-demand subject areas, like math and special education.  Table 1A, for 
instance, demonstrates that teachers in these high-demand areas tend to be less senior than 
other teachers, and there may well be greater costs associated with recruiting teachers in these 
areas in the future. 
Beyond the effects of seniority-based layoffs on the teacher workforce overall is the 
potential for distributional consequences.  For instance, a recent report on the Los Angeles 
school district (UCLA/IDEA 2009) concluded that, since the district is required to use seniority as 
the primary criterion for layoffs and schools with high proportions of low-income students and 
                                                        
8 This somewhat overstates the true impact of the difference in teacher layoff systems since some portion 
on measured teacher effectiveness is measurement error (Goldhaber and Hansen 2010b; McCaffrey et al. 
2009), but the authors account for this by comparing teachers under the two regimes in the future.  In 
these estimates they still find a differential of 12 percent of a standard deviation of student achievement. 
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students of color employ more first- and second-year teachers than other schools in the district, 
seniority-based layoffs will disproportionately affect schools with high proportions of at-risk 
students.   This was not born out in the case of the Boyd et al. work from New York, nor in work 
by Plecki et al. (2010), who present summary statistics for the Washington State teachers laid off 
in the first cycle of layoffs in 2008-09 and find “little variation by student poverty level or 
race/ethnicity” at the district level.9  But, ultimately the distributional effects depend on which 
teachers (in terms of seniority and effectiveness) are teaching in which schools and that may 
differ from district to district.   
 
III.  Data, and Analytic Approach 
Data 
 
The analyses here are based on a unique dataset from Washington State that links teachers to 
their schools and, in some cases, their students; the dataset also includes information on those 
teachers who received reduction-in-force (“RIF”) notices in the 2008-09 and 2009-10 school 
years (we use the terms “RIF notice” and “layoff notice” interchangeably).  
Information on RIF notices was collected in each year by Washington State’s 
Professional Education Standards Board (PESB).  In the 2008-09 school year 2144 employees 
received a layoff notice and in 2009-10 450 employees received a notice. Teachers receiving 
these notices can be linked with administrative records that include information about their 
teaching credentials, school assignments, degrees, and compensation.  Information on teacher 
employment is derived from the S-275 administrative database, which is an annual personnel-
reporting process that provides a record of certificated and classified employees working in 
                                                        
9 Note that they do not look at the distributional consequence of teacher layoffs within districts, which 
where the disparities, like those referenced in Los Angeles, are likely to arise. 
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Washington State’s school districts including information such as their places of employment, 
experience and degree, gender and race, and annual compensation levels.10  We restrict the 
sample to employees whose duty root indicates they were in a teaching position that year, and 
further restrict the sample of teachers receiving a layoff notice to teachers who appear in this 
database, meaning that we only consider teachers who were hired by October 1 of the year they 
received a layoff notice.11  These restrictions leave a sample of 1717 teachers who received a 
layoff notice in 2008-09 and 407 teachers who received a layoff notice in 2009-10, with 130 
teachers who received a layoff notice in both school years.  Overall, about 2 percent of teachers 
in the state received a layoff notice in either year. 
The S-275 includes a measure of cumulative teaching experience in the state, but does 
not include a direct measure of teacher seniority in each district—an important variable to 
consider since some collective bargaining agreements specify seniority, as opposed to 
experience, as a factor in determining which teachers are dismissed in the event of necessary 
downsizing.  Given this, we calculate a rough measure of seniority by tracing each teacher 
through S-275 databases going back to 1994-95 and recording how many years (up to 14 in 
2008-09 and 15 in 2009-10) the teacher has been employed by his or her current school district.  
We impute seniority values for teachers who have taught in the same district since 1994-95 to 
reflect the expected spread of values beyond 14 or 15 years of seniority.12  Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of teachers who received layoff notices in 2008-09 or 2009-10 by experience and 
                                                        
10 Technically, the database contains the amount apportioned to the district to pay each teacher.  
However, most (if not all) districts pay teachers the apportioned amount in the database. 
11 Several teachers who received a layoff notice were not in the S-275 database, meaning they were hired 
after October 1 of that school year.  However, it is not possible to include teachers who were hired after 
October 1 who did not receive a layoff notice, so we restrict the sample to teachers who appear in the S-
275.  Note that our sample also includes teachers who left before the end of the school year for reasons 
other than receiving a RIF notice. 
12 The number of years of in-district experience is, on average, 75 percent of the number of years of in-
state experience (for teachers who have taught fewer than 15 years).  So, for teachers with the maximum 
number of years of in-district experience, the in-district experience value was imputed using the formula 
exp_dis = exp_dis + [(exp-exp_dis) * .75]. 
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seniority, and clearly shows that most of the teachers receiving RIF notices are junior 
(approximately 60 percent of RIFed teachers have two or fewer years of experience, and 
approximately 80 percent have two or fewer years of seniority).  It is interesting, however, that 
some teachers are actually well into their careers, implying that there are districts in the state 
that are making judgments about which teachers should be laid off based on criteria other than 
seniority alone. 
 In addition to the S-275, the PESB personnel database includes information about 
teacher credentials, such as where each teacher was trained and in what areas each teacher 
holds endorsements.13  The database includes an entry for each new and renewed credential a 
teacher has received in his or her career, and we use this database in two different ways to 
calculate measures of teacher training and endorsements.  First, we restrict the database to 
include each teacher’s oldest credential that came from a college or university, and use the 
institution that issued the credential as the teacher’s college.14  We code each teacher’s college 
using the 2008 NCES/Barrons Admissions Competitiveness Index15 (1 = most competitive, 
7=least competitive) to create a measure of the selectivity of each teacher’s college.  The 
database also includes the endorsement area of each credential, so we include indicators for the 
number of endorsements and whether teachers hold endorsements in any one of ten areas: 
math, science, English/reading, social studies, elementary education, special education, 
health/PE, arts, languages, and other (including agriculture/technology, office staff, 
                                                        
13 This database has missing data for both very old teachers—who began teaching before the state started 
to require and track teaching credentials—and very new teachers who have either not finalized their 
credentials or whose paperwork has not been processed yet.  We discuss our approach to missing data in 
the analytic approach section. 
14 A large proportion of teachers have received all their credentials directly from the state’s Office of the 
Superintendent for Public Instruction, meaning they either received their credential from out of state or 
through an alternative certification route.  This means we have college selectivity data for 39,261 of the 
55,656 teachers in the 2008-09 sample.  We discuss our approach to missing data in the analytic approach 
section. 
15 For more information, see http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2010331 
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administration, etc.)16. 
Information about the schools in which teachers are employed is derived from two 
sources: the Washington State Report Card, which includes school-level achievement data on 
the Washington Assessment of Student Learning (WASL), as well as student and teacher 
demographics; and the Common Core of Data, which provides school- and district-level 
information for all public elementary and secondary schools in the United States, such as school 
location, school level, and district spending.  We use the Washington State Report Card to 
measure the racial composition, student-teacher ratio, percent of students enrolled in the free 
or reduced meals program, total enrollment, and percent of students who passed the reading 
and math WASL exams in each teacher’s school.  We use the Common Core of Data to create a 
dummy variable for whether each teacher teaches in an urban area17, dummy variables for the 
level of each teacher’s school, and the per pupil expenditure on instruction by each teacher’s 
district. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides sample statistics for teachers who either did or did not 
receive a RIF notice in 2008-09.  We chose to use only the 2008-09 year because some teachers 
received a layoff notice in both years of the data, but the results are very similar whether or not 
the averages are for 2008-09 as in the table, 2009-10, or aggregated across years.18  Not 
surprisingly, in each year, teachers receiving RIF notices (“RIFed teachers”) are less experienced 
and less senior, by about 10 and 8 years respectively.   RIFed teachers are also far less likely to 
hold an advanced degree.  Consequently, there is an average difference of about $15,000 in 
                                                        
16 For the summary statistics presented in the next section, we restrict the database to include only each 
teacher’s most recent credential, so each teacher also has a single dummy variable for the area in which 
he or she is most recently endorsed. 
17 For the purposes of this paper, we define “urban” as an urbanized area within a city of 100,000 people 
or more. 
18 Teachers who received layoff notices in 2009-10 were more experienced on average by about a year 
and a half than teachers who received layoff notices in 2008-09, and there’s less evidence that high-needs 
subjects (defined below) were protected. 
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salary between the average RIFed and non-RIFed teachers. 
Had all 1717 teachers who received RIF notices in 2008-09 actually been laid off, the 
direct salary savings in the state would have been $5,521,238.  As noted above, one of the 
prevailing critiques of seniority-based layoffs is that it is necessary to lay off more teachers in 
order to attain a specified budget objective than would have been laid off using alternative 
criteria.  Based on the actual salaries of teachers in each school district, we calculate the number 
of teacher layoffs that would be necessary to achieve the same (or slightly greater) budgetary 
savings in each district if the teachers laid off in each district were earning the district-average 
salary.  Based on this, and aggregating to the state-level, it is estimated that it would only be 
necessary to lay off 1349 teachers in order to attain the same (or greater) budgetary savings; 
this is approximately 20 percent less than the actual number of teachers (1717) who received 
layoff notices.19  In the final section we explore more explicitly the question of the budgetary 
implications of layoffs that are based on teacher effectiveness. 
According to the 2006 report “Educator Supply and Demand in Washington State” 
(Lashway et al. 2006), there are 14 endorsement areas for which there are “high degrees of 
shortage,” all of which fall into math, science, or special education areas.  Thus, we classify any 
teacher with an endorsement in one of these areas as high-needs.  Based on this aggregation 
across endorsements, there is some evidence to suggest that school districts are protecting 
teachers in high-needs subjects; 13.33 percent of RIFed teachers fell into a high-needs category 
while 15.10 percent of non-RIFed teachers also did.20 
Teachers receiving a notice tended to be in smaller schools, but contrary to existing 
                                                        
19 The actual number of layoffs necessary to meet a budgetary target under the assumption that teachers 
with the average salary in each district are laid off is somewhat overstated given that the number of 
teachers necessary to achieve a budgetary target for each district is rounded up in cases where the 
estimate is not a whole number. 
20 An alternative measure of high-needs subjects, based on the federal TEACH grant program’s definition 
of “high-need subjects”, presents a similar picture. 
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research (UCLA/IDEA 2009; Sepe and Roza 2010), RIFed teachers were not, in general, more 
likely to be teaching in schools with high proportions of minority students or lower WASL 
achievement levels.  
School-level measures can mask a significant degree of teacher sorting across 
classrooms within schools.  Fortunately, a subset of teachers and students can be linked 
together through the proctor on each student’s state assessment.21  This allows for aggregation 
of student data to the classroom level from two additional student-based administrative 
datasets: the Core Student Record System (CSRS) and WASL databases.  It also allows for the 
estimation of value-added models (VAMs) of teacher effectiveness.  The CSRS database includes 
information on student’s race/ethnicity, free and/or reduced-price meal eligibility status, and 
status in the following programs:  LAP reading/math, Title I reading/math, Title I Migrant, 
Gifted/Highly Capable, State Transitional Bilingual Program, and Special Education.   The WASL 
database includes information on students’ achievement on the Washington State Assessment 
of Student Learning (WASL)—a regular annual statewide assessment tests for 3rd through 8th and 
10th grades. 
Although we do not have student achievement data for the 2009-10 school year, there 
are over 10,000 teachers in the 2008-09 school year that can be directly linked to student-level 
information, and we can calculate VAM teacher effectiveness estimates for about 6,600 of them 
(this is approximately 12 percent of all teachers employed in the state).  One hundred forty-five 
of these teachers received a RIF notice in the 2008-09 school year.  Panel B of Table 1 reports 
the classroom level sample statistics for this subset of teachers in 2008-09.22  These classroom 
                                                        
21 The proctor of the state assessment was used as the teacher-student link for at least some of the data 
used for analysis. The 'proctor’ variable was not intended to be a link between students and their 
classroom teachers so this link may not accurately identify those classroom teachers. 
22 The classroom-level statistics include all the students in the teacher’s class, not just the students whose 
test scores are used to generate the teacher’s VAM estimate. 
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level characteristics present a slightly different picture of the differences between RIF and non-
RIF teachers than do the school-level characteristics.  For instance, compared to the school-level 
aggregates, the classroom level measures for percentage of poor students are relatively higher 
for RIFed teachers and the percentage of white students is relatively lower.  Also, the average 
student achievement in classrooms with RIFed teachers is lower than the average achievement 
in other classrooms.  The dichotomy of findings between the school- and classroom-levels 
suggests within school inequities in the distribution of teachers. 
Panel B of Table 1 also includes the average value-added estimate of teacher 
effectiveness of RIFed and non-RIFed teachers, and the results demonstrate that the average 
teacher who received a RIF notice was about 5 percent of a standard deviation less effective (in 
both reading and math) than the average teacher who did not receive a RIF notice. 23 This result 
is not surprising given that teachers who received RIF notices included many first-and second-
year teachers, and many studies have shown that, on average, effectiveness improves 
substantially over a teacher’s first few years teaching (Clotfelter et al. 2006; Goldhaber and 
Hansen 2010a; Rivkin et al. 2005; Rockoff 2004).  That said Figure 2 demonstrates there is 
tremendous overlap in the effectiveness of RIFed and non-RIFed teachers24. Importantly, Figure 
2 shows that a significant proportion of the RIFed teachers were more effective than the 
average teacher in the state. 
 
Analytic Approach 
 
In order to provide a more contextualized picture of the factors influencing teacher RIF notices, 
we estimate binary logit models where the dependent variable, Yi t , is indicator of whether or 
                                                        
23 These estimates of effectiveness are based on the models described below (equations 2 and 3) and are 
“shrunken” using Empirical Bayes techniques. 
24 We present the density of each distribution to highlight the differences in the two distributions. 
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not teacher i in school j in year t received a RIF notice: 
Logit(P(Yijkt 1)) ln
P(Y 1)
P(Y 0)
Tit 1 S jt 2 Dkt 3 t .   (1) 
In the baseline, we model the probability of receiving a RIF notice as a function of 
individual teacher characteristicsTi t , including:  seniority in district
25, degree level (MA or 
higher), gender, race, college selectivity, and endorsement area; the characteristics of the 
teacher’s school, Sij , including urbanicity, grade level (e.g., high school), enrollment, student-
teacher ratio, the percentage of students who are eligible for the free/reduced-price lunch 
program, the percentage of minority students, and measures of student achievement in reading 
and math; the characteristics of a teacher’s district, Dkt, including enrollment, per pupil 
expenditures, and percent of funding that comes from local, state, and federal sources;  and a 
year effect, t .
26 
Seniority is clearly a significant factor in determining which teachers receive RIF notices 
in many school districts throughout the state.  Not all districts, however, are required by their 
bargaining agreements to only consider seniority.  Some agreements, for instance, give districts 
the discretion to retain more junior teachers if they are in high-demand subjects so variables 
identifying teachers’ endorsement areas are of interest.  To get an idea of what observable 
teacher characteristics are associated with the probability of receiving a RIF notice, we first run 
variants of (1) that only include teacher covariates (Tit) as predictors.  We run several 
parameterizations of this model to capture the different ways teacher endorsement area and 
seniority could be associated with the probability of a RIF notice.  Different parameterizations 
                                                        
25 Experience and seniority are highly correlated (a bivariate correlation of about .85) so we only include 
seniority in the models.  The results are very similar if experience is used in place of seniority. 
26 In each model, we also include missing value dummies to test whether teachers with missing values in 
each area differ significantly from other teachers.  The only variable for which the missing value dummy 
was ever significant was endorsement area, which is not surprising since this data is missing mostly for 
very experienced teachers who were unlikely to receive a RIF notice.   
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include a dummy for whether the teacher’s most recent endorsement is in a “high-needs” area, 
dummies for the subject area of the teacher’s most recent endorsement, a dummy for whether 
the teacher has any endorsement in a high-needs area, and dummies for every endorsement a 
teacher has received. We also include interactions between endorsement areas and the number 
of additional endorsements to account for teachers who multiple endorsements.  We repeat all 
these parameterizations with models that treat seniority as a categorical variable to account for 
the possibility that the effect of seniority could be non-linear. 
Whether student characteristics predict a teacher being RIFed is also of interest.  Which 
teachers lose their jobs as a result of budget constraints is likely to be a politically contentious 
issue; teacher layoffs in large districts from Los Angeles (Daly and Ramanathan 2010) to 
Charlotte (Frazier 2009) have sparked fierce public debate—both in the press and in public 
rallies—about the distribution of layoffs across the district.  On one side, proponents of the 
seniority-driven system argue that without clearly delineated rules for layoffs, teachers in 
schools and districts with more politically active and powerful constituencies will receive 
preferential treatment.27  On the other side, opponents point to the three potential negative 
consequences of seniority-driven layoffs outlined in the previous section: higher layoff rates, 
distributional consequences across endorsement areas, and distributional consequences across 
a district.  Either way, any teacher layoff policy has potential student equity consequences given 
that there are achievement consequences associated with the churn of teachers. 
To capture the association between school and district covariates and the probability of 
RIF notices, we add observable school (Sjt) and district (Dkt) variables to the model.  We 
parameterize this model to treat school demographics as either continuous (percent of each 
                                                        
27 For instance, as the California Teachers Association Handbook states: “The seniority system should be 
encouraged. The seniority system has demonstrated its equity and validity in protecting the rights of all 
employees. All personnel begin vesting in the system from the first day of service, and modification of the 
seniority system imperils job security for all employees” (CTA 2009). 
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race within the school) or categorical (quintiles of minority composition) to account for possible 
non-linear effects of this variable.  Importantly, the coefficients on the teacher covariates in this 
model should be interpreted as the marginal effects of these teacher characteristics relative to 
teachers at comparable schools within comparable districts.   
The reality, though, is that decisions regarding RIF notices are most likely to happen at 
the district level, and district covariates cannot capture all the variation in RIF policies due to 
district-level factors.  Thus, our final model substitutes a district fixed-effect (not shown in (1)) 
for district covariates.  In this model, the coefficients on teacher and school covariates now 
represent the marginal effect of these variables measured relative to other teachers and schools 
within the same district. 
These variants of (1) give a full picture of observable teacher, school, and district 
characteristics that are associated with RIF notices, but perhaps of greatest interest is the 
relative effectiveness of teachers who are RIFed.  As mentioned above, a subset of teachers can 
be linked to students.  For these teachers, we experiment with including value-added measures 
of teacher effectiveness in (1) above to see whether job performance (at least this measure of 
it) influences which teachers receive a layoff notice.  This, of course, requires the estimation of 
teachers’ job performance. 
 There is a growing body of literature that uses value-added models (VAMs) to measure 
the average difference between the actual and predicted performance of a teacher’s students 
(e.g. Aaronson et al. 2007; Goldhaber and Hansen 2010b; McCaffrey et al. 2009), but there is no 
universally accepted method for calculating a teacher’s value-added contribution and research 
shows that methodology and context can influence the measure (Ballou, Sanders, and Wright 
2004; McCaffrey et al. 2004; Rothstein 2010; Rubin, Stuart, and Zanutto 2004; Tekwe et al. 
2004).  The baseline specification is run separately for each grade and year: 
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Aijkst Ais(t 1) X it
n
jt ijkst (2) 
In (2), i represents students, j represents teachers, k represents schools, n represents the years 
of teacher experience, s represents subject area (math or reading), and t represents the school 
year.  Student achievement normed within grade and year, Aijkst, is regressed against: prior 
student achievement, Aijks(t-1), and a vector of student and family background characteristics (for 
example, age, race and ethnicity, disability, free or reduced-price lunch status, and parental 
education level), Xit.  The remaining teacher fixed-effect (
n
jt) is the VAM estimate for teacher j 
in year t, who is in her nth year of teaching.  The error term, ijkst associated with a particular 
student is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero.28 
 The advantage of model (2) is that it produces a separate VAM estimate for each 
teacher in each school year.  This allows us, for example, to calculate a teacher’s value-added 
performance the year (or the year before) she received a RIF notice.   However, the flexibility of 
model (2) comes with significant costs.  First, the teacher-year effect is confounded with 
classroom and school contributions to student learning, meaning that we cannot control for 
class- and school-level variables that may also affect student test score gains.  Second, model (2) 
necessarily uses only single years of matched teacher-student data, while research shows that 
basing teacher effect estimates on multiple years decreases the relative magnitude of sampling 
error in the estimates, providing a more precise (Goldhaber and Hansen 2010b; McCaffrey et al. 
2009), and potentially less biased (Koedel and Betts, forthcoming) estimate of teacher quality. 
For this reason, when we do not need VAM estimates that vary by year, we use the time-variant 
VAM estimate from model (2) to a produce a time-invariant VAM estimate for each teacher, 
                                                        
28 Note that we plan to focus on self-contained classrooms so that subject area does not vary by teacher, class, 
or school. However, the annual class grouping of students implies shared (and potentially unobservable) 
environmental factors that will influence the performance of the entire class, contributing to positive intra-class 
correlation among students in the same classroom that should be accounted for by clustering students at the 
classroom level. 
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controlling for classroom and school covariates: 
n
jt C jt Gt t n
y
j  (3) 
 In model (3), the time-variant VAM estimate for teacher j in year t ( n jt  ) is regressed 
against: the student’s class size that year, Cjt
29; year, t, and grade, Gt, effects; and (for an 
experienced-adjusted estimate) the teacher’s years of experience (n). The remaining teacher 
fixed-effect ( y j ) is the time-invariant VAM estimate based on y years of data for teacher j, and 
can be interpreted as the teacher’s contribution to student test score gains over all y years 
included in the model.  This model is less accurate for teachers who have short careers (i.e. 
those more likely to receive a RIF notice) than teachers with more years of data. 
The VAM estimate produced by model (3) is appropriate when we want to measure the 
effectiveness of a teacher relative to other teachers with the same teaching experience.  
However, we also want to produce estimates of teacher effectiveness that do not control for 
experience, so we can compare the effectiveness of, say, a first-year teacher to a fifth-year 
teacher.  In this case, we drop the n term to produce a non-experience-adjusted VAM estimate: 
n
jt C jt Gt t
y
j  (4) 
When we substitute model (4) into model (2), we see that this results in a model that controls 
for student background and class size, and can include multiple years of data: 
Aijkst Ais(t 1) X it C jt
y
j Gt t ijkst (5) 
We utilize model (5) to produce teacher effectiveness estimates that are pooled across 
                                                        
29 Many time-invariant models include an entire vector of classroom and school covariates.  However, we found 
that there was insufficient mixing of students between schools and insufficient variation in classroom 
characteristics across years, so the standard errors of the VAM estimates were significantly larger when we 
included these covariates.  Given that we need accurate standard errors to produce Empirical Bayes shrinkage 
estimates (Aaronson et al. 2007), we chose only to include class size in the time-invariant model, as it varied 
sufficiently from year to year. 
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all three years (y = 3) of student performance data.30  We also experiment with variants of 
model (5) to test the robustness of our results, including a model that substitutes a student 
fixed-effect for student-level covariates.  In theory this approach controls for individual-level 
student time-invariant factors that are not captured by the student covariates, however, it is 
worth noting that student fixed-effects generally have low power on the estimation of the 
student fixed-effects themselves (due to data limitations from observing students in just a few 
years), and tests of the joint hypothesis that all student effects are non-zero commonly fail to 
reject.31  Finally, we adjust the teacher effect estimates using empirical Bayes (EB) methods.32 
We find that the unadjusted teacher effect is 0.24 (i.e., a one standard deviation change in 
teacher effectiveness corresponds with a 0.24 change in student performance) in both math and 
reading, and the EB shrunken estimates suggest effect sizes of 0.19 in math and a 0.18 in 
student reading. 
We use the various estimates of teacher effectiveness estimated by (2) and (5) in 
modeling the likelihood that teachers receive a RIF notice (1).  The assumption is that if teacher 
effectiveness is considered—and more specifically, if more effective teachers are less likely to be 
RIFed—then the coefficient on the VAM estimate should be negative.  Since we do not have 
student achievement data for the 2009-10 school year, we only use the RIF data from 2008-09 
for this part of the analysis. 
                                                        
30 In the case where teachers are in the workforce in all those years, the effectiveness estimates for many junior 
teachers are, of course, based on fewer years of data. 
31 Moreover, a recent paper by Kane and Staiger (2008) not only finds that a student fixed-effects specification 
understates teacher effects in a VAM levels specification (where the dependent variable is the achievement of 
students in year t and the model includes a control for prior student achievement in year t-1), but also that the 
student fixed-effects were insignificant in a VAM gains specification (where the dependent variable is the gain 
in student achievement from one year to the next). By contrast, they find a specification that includes a vector 
of prior student achievement measures produces teacher effects quite similar to those produced under 
conditions where teachers are randomly matched to their classrooms. 
32 The standard empirical Bayes method shrinks estimates back to the grand mean of the population. Note, 
however, that standard empirical Bayes adjustment does not properly account for the uncertainty in the grand 
mean, suggesting the estimates are shrunk too much (McCaffrey et al. 2009). We use the standard approach 
that’s been commonly estimated in the literature (an appendix on empirical Bayes shrinkage is available from 
the authors by request). 
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IV.  Results 
 
Table 2 provides the estimated marginal coefficients from logit models identifying if teachers 
received a RIF notice in 2008-09 or 2009-10.33  The first column presents a model with only 
teacher characteristics, including a dummy variable for whether a teacher’s most recent 
endorsement falls into a high-needs category; in the second column a teacher’s endorsement 
area is broken out.  Columns 3 and 4 substitute dummy variables for every area in which a 
teacher in endorsed, again first considering just whether a teacher has any credential in a high-
needs area, and then breaking out all teacher endorsement areas.  Column 5 adds in a vector of 
school and district characteristics, and in the final column, district characteristics are replaced by 
a district fixed-effect.34 
 As expected, experience/seniority play an important role in determining whether 
teachers receive a layoff notice (“are RIFed”).35  The significant negative coefficients on a 
teacher having an advanced degree or an endorsement in a high-needs area36 provides evidence 
that districts are also protecting teachers thought to have advanced or hard-to-recruit skills.  In 
fact, the magnitudes of these coefficients suggest relatively large differences in the likelihood of 
receiving a layoff notice for teachers who fall into one of these categories: having a master’s 
degree or an endorsement in a high-needs area lowers the probability of being RIFed by about 
                                                        
33 The results are found to be qualitatively similar when the models are estimated separately for each school 
year.  The only major difference is that fewer of the variables are statistically significant in 2009-10, which is not 
surprising given the smaller sample of RIFed teachers in that year. 
34 The logit coefficients represent the expected change in the log odds of a teacher receiving an RIF notice per 
one-unit change in the predictor.  For a more straightforward interpretation, however, we transform the 
coefficients into marginal effects and present the results in terms of the marginal probability of receiving a RIF 
notice.  With the exception of the district fixed-effect model, we calculate the marginal effects at the individual 
level (as recommended in Greene 2000, p. 816) and then take the sample mean of those effects to calculate the 
overall marginal effect of each variable.  The significance levels are p < 0.1 (*), p < 0.05 (**), and p < 0.01 (***). 
35 The effect of seniority is unlikely to be linear: the difference between years 1 and 2 of seniority should be 
different than the difference between years 21 and 22, for example.  Thus, we interpret the marginal effects of 
seniority later in this section when we discuss non-linear effects (Table 3). 
36 Note that having an endorsement in a high-needs area is significantly negatively associated with the 
probability of receiving a RIF notice whether it is the teacher’s most recent endorsement or any of the teacher’s 
endorsements. 
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.6 percentage points each.  Non-white teachers (not shown in Table 2) are marginally less likely 
to receive a RIF notice, although this significance disappears in models that control for school 
and district characteristics. 
 The results presented in column 2 break out the high-needs variable into different 
endorsement areas.  These findings appear to suggest that the significant negative effect of the 
high-needs endorsements on the probability of receiving a layoff notice is largely driven by 
having an endorsement in special education. Interestingly, there is only marginal evidence in 
this model that the jobs of teachers with math and science endorsements are being protected 
from layoffs more than teachers with other specialties, but subsequent models will demonstrate 
that this result is sensitive to model specification. Also, there is a significant positive effect of a 
teacher’s most recent endorsement being in health and PE or arts (music, art, theater, etc.) on 
the probability of receiving a RIF notice.37 
 Column 3 also presents the marginal effects of different endorsement areas, but now 
we are considering every endorsement a teacher has and we interact each endorsement area 
with the number of additional endorsements (other than that area) a teacher has.  The 
coefficients in this model can be interpreted as follows: the coefficient on each endorsement 
area represents the marginal effect of having an endorsement only in that area, and the 
coefficient on each interaction term represents the average marginal effect of each additional 
endorsement for teachers who hold an endorsement in that area.38  Now that we are 
considering all teacher endorsements, the coefficients on math, science, and special education 
                                                        
37 The reference category for endorsement area is elementary education (the most common endorsement in 
Washington State), meaning that each coefficient represents the marginal effect of being most recently 
endorsed in that area relative to elementary education.  As discussed in the analytic approach section, the 
dummy variable for missing endorsement area was also significant, but by including it in the model we ensure 
that the reference category is elementary teachers only.  We control for missing endorsement area in each 
model in Tables 2 and 3.   
38 In this model, the reference category is teachers who only have an endorsement in elementary education, 
meaning that all coefficients should be interpreted relative to this group. 
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are all significantly negative39, indicating that (all else equal) teachers holding an endorsement in 
any high-needs area are less likely to receive a layoff notice.  The marginal effects of holding an 
endorsement in either health and PE or arts remain significant and positive. 
 The marginal effect on nearly every interaction term is negative, and often significant.  
This lends credence to the notion that school districts are behaving strategically to protect 
teachers who have endorsements in multiple areas and therefore provide flexibility in terms of 
the classes they can teach.  However, there is a question of the mechanism through which this 
takes place.  Many of the collective bargaining agreements we reviewed stipulate that seniority-
based layoffs should take place within credential area, and with good reason; Table 1A presents 
the distribution of the seniority of Washington teachers within each credentialing area, and 
demonstrates that there is significant variability in seniority across credentialing areas.  In 
particular, teachers endorsed in math, elementary education, and special education are, on 
average, considerably less senior than teachers in other areas.40 Because of this variability, it is 
conceivable that the negative marginal effects of teachers being credentialed in math, science,  
or special education is solely a product of the relative seniority of teachers within those areas.41 
 The specification in column 4 adds vectors of district and school covariates to the model 
(not shown).  An F-test shows that each of these vectors significantly improves the fit of the 
                                                        
39 Running this model with a dummy variable indicating whether a teacher has any endorsement in a high-
needs area produces similar results to column 1. 
40 The 10th percentile of seniority for both math and special education is 0, meaning that over 10 percent of 
math and special education teachers in the state are in their first year in the district. 
41 Specifically, our logit models estimate the probability of a teacher receiving a layoff notice relative to other 
teachers of the same seniority. Since math teachers are significantly less senior than PE teachers, for example, 
in a system that gives layoff notices by seniority within credentialing areas, a third-year math teacher may be 
less likely to receive a layoff notice solely because she is relatively more senior within her credentialing area. 
We test this possibility by running a model that does not control for seniority, and find that the coefficients on 
several endorsement areas are still negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a RIF notice: special 
education, science, and social studies are all significantly negative, while arts is significantly positive.  This 
suggests that our results reflect a combination of administrators protecting hard-to-staff areas, such as special 
education, and giving RIF notices by seniority within endorsement areas. 
  23 
model42, but the addition of these variables has little effect on most of the estimated teacher 
coefficients with the exception of non-white, which is no longer statistically significant.  
However, many of the school-level variables identifying student demographics are statistically 
significant.  Teachers in schools with fewer students receiving free and reduced price lunch and 
greater percentages of students passing the state assessment are marginally less likely to be 
RIFed; this is as might be expected if there is a correlation between poverty, student 
achievement, and the political activism of parents.  But, contrary to at least some of the rhetoric 
around layoffs (UCLA/IDEA 2009; Sepe and Roza 2010), it appears that, all else equal, teachers in 
urban schools and in schools with more black and Hispanic students are less likely to be RIFed.  
Note that this does not necessarily mean that minority students are not disproportionately 
affected by teacher layoffs since schools with high-minority enrollments might also share other 
characteristics, (e.g. the seniority level of teachers) that influence layoffs.  We explore the 
implications of this in greater detail in the next section of the paper.   
Of the district-level variables, the marginal effect of district size is negative, while the 
marginal effect of the percent of a district’s funding that comes from local sources (like property 
taxes) is significantly positive.  This last finding also runs contrary to conventional wisdom, as it 
indicates (all else equal) that teachers in districts with a greater proportion of local funding—
traditionally districts with high property values and active parents groups43—were more likely to 
receive RIF notices. 
The final specification, reported in column 5 of the table presents the results of a district 
                                                        
42 The F-statistic was 24.52 for school variables and 10.89 for district variables, each with a p-value of less than 
.0001. 
43 The correlation between these variables is well established, although causality is open to interpretation; the 
basis of dozens of school finance court cases, including Seattle School District v. State, 1977 (Fraser 2005), is 
that districts with higher property values and more politically active parents tend to receive more local funding, 
but papers in the economics literature (e.g., Megdal 1984) argue that in districts that receive a higher 
proportion of their funding from local sources, voters and parents have an incentive to pay higher property 
taxes and be more politically active. 
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fixed-effect specification.  The results for the teacher covariates in this specification are 
qualitatively similar to those without district fixed-effects: greater seniority, having a master’s 
degree, and being endorsed in math, science, special education are negatively associated with 
the probability of receiving a RIF notice, while the associations for having an endorsement only 
in health/PE, or arts are positive.  The inclusion of district fixed-effect drastically alters the 
marginal effects of many school-level covariates; urbanicity, percent Hispanic students,44 
percent free/reduced lunch, and measures of student achievement are no longer statistically 
significant. Under this model, both the magnitude and significance of the negative marginal 
effects of a teacher being credentialed in math, science, or special education grow 
significantly.45 
 The specifications reported in Table 3 relax the assumption of linearity in the effect of 
seniority and school composition.  Specifically, in each specification seniority is broken into 
seven categories: teachers with 1 year or less, 1–2 years, 2–3 years, 3–4 years, 4–6 years, 7–11 
years, and 12 or more years of seniority.46   Looking across the columns, it is apparent that the 
addition of categorical variables identifying student characteristics and/or the inclusion of 
school fixed-effects has little impact on the estimates of the effects of seniority on the likelihood 
                                                        
44 Many districts that have a high proportion of Hispanic students did not issue any RIF notices, so it is not 
surprising that this variable is not significant under a district fixed-effect model. 
45 As a hypothetical example of how effects can change under a district fixed-effect model, consider two large 
districts, District A and District B, each of which has 1000 teachers.  Suppose 20 percent of District A's teachers 
are credentialed in "high-needs" areas, while only 10 percent of teachers in District B have such a credential.  
Further suppose that District A sends RIF notices to 100 teachers, 18 of whom are in "high-needs areas", while 
District B sends RIF notices to 25 teachers, 2 of whom are in "high-needs” areas.  Then for each district, the 
proportion of RIF notices given to "high-needs" teachers is less than the proportion of high-needs teachers in 
the district (18 percent vs. 20 percent in District A, 8 percent vs. 10 percent in District B,) but if we aggregate 
across districts we see that 16 percent of all teachers who received a RIF notice were in a high-needs area, 
while high-needs teachers only account for 15 percent of the teachers across the two districts.  Without a 
district fixed-effect, we might conclude that districts are sending RIF notices to a higher proportion of teachers 
in high-needs areas, while within each district the opposite is true (this phenomenon is known as Simpson's 
Paradox).  
46 Twelve or more years of seniority is used as the reference category for this variable, so all coefficients should 
be interpreted relative to teachers who have taught 12 or more years in the district.  Separate specifications 
that use other levels as the reference category demonstrate that these marginal effects are significantly 
different from each other as well as from the 12 years and over group. 
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of receiving a RIF notice.  The magnitudes of the seniority coefficients indicate that a first-year 
teacher is over twice as likely (all else equal) to receive a RIF notice than a teacher in her 4th–6th 
years in the district.47 
 In column 2 of the table, we add categorical measures of school- and district-level 
covariates: whether the teacher teaches in a school that falls in the first, second, third, fourth, 
or fifth quintile of schools in terms of percent of Hispanic of black students.48  The results 
indicate that teachers in schools that fall in the top two quintiles of percent minority students 
were significantly less likely (all else equal) to receive a layoff notice, which again runs counter 
to some of the rhetoric about layoffs.  As with seniority, this parameterization of racial 
composition does not significantly alter the marginal effect of any other teacher, school, or 
district covariate. 
 Column 3 adds a district fixed-effect, and here the statistical significance of the top two 
quintiles disappears.49  In other words, while teachers at schools with a high percentage of 
minority students are less likely (all else equal) to receive RIF notices, this effect does not persist 
when the percent of minority students is measured relative to other schools in the same district.  
 Columns 4 and 5 repeat the same exercise, this time including categorical variables for 
whether the teacher teaches in a school that falls in the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth 
quintile of schools in terms of percent of students in the Free or Reduced Meal Program.50  The 
results of the model that includes school and district covariates (column 4) suggest that teachers 
in school in the top quintile of free/reduced meal participation are significantly less likely to 
                                                        
47 This parameterization of seniority does not significantly change the marginal effects of the endorsement 
areas presented in Table 2, so we have omitted them from Table 3. 
48 The reference category for these variables is the first quintile, so coefficients should be interpreted as relative 
to teachers who teach in school whose percent of minority students falls in the lowest 20 percent of the state. 
49 An F-test indicated that including a district fixed-effect significantly improved the fit of the model (F = 20.40), 
which is not surprising since RIF decisions were made at the district level. 
50 We do not run models with both percent minority and percent free and reduced priced meals due to high 
bivariate correlation (0.72). 
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receive a layoff notice, but this significance disappears under the district fixed-effect model 
(column 5).  Again, the interpretation is that while teachers at schools with a high percentage of 
low-income students are less likely (all else equal) to receive RIF notices, this effect does not 
persist when the percent of low-income students is measured relative to other schools in the 
same district.  
 
 
Is Teacher Effectiveness Considered in RIF Decisions? 
 
In Table 4 we report selected findings on models estimating the probability of receiving a RIF 
notice in 2008-09 for models that include various estimates of teacher effectiveness. Prior to 
discussing our main findings on teacher effectiveness, it is worth noting that, while we do not 
report them in the model, the inclusion of the teacher effectiveness variables do little to change 
the estimated effects of the district and school-level covariates or those teacher characteristics 
not reported in the table. 
We include a variety of different teacher effectiveness measures in the RIF models in 
order to test the robustness of our findings. It is conceivable that judgments about teachers may 
be made based on a teacher’s performance in the year in which layoffs occur so column 1 of the 
table includes teacher-year value-added effect estimates.51 Of course it is also possible that 
administrators’ judgments are based on a teacher’s prior year of performance given that value-
added estimates (or more simple means of calculating the academic growth of the students in a 
teacher’s classroom) are unlikely to be available at the time that layoff notices are sent out. So, 
in column 2 we include teacher-year effect estimates based on the year prior to the year in 
                                                        
51 Note that the teacher-year effect estimates are from model specifications that do not include classroom or 
school covariates. 
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which teachers received a layoff notice.52 
Research clearly shows a degree of intertemporal instability in VAM estimates of 
teacher effectiveness (Aaronson et al. 2007; Goldhaber and Hansen 2010b; McCaffrey et al. 
2009; Sass 2008) but estimates that are based on multiple years of teacher-student data are 
both more stable and less noisy. Given this, we report results for models that include as much 
matched student-teacher data as is available for each teacher in column 3.53 
Administrators may wish to protect the jobs of teachers who show a great deal of 
potential even if they are less effective than more senior teachers. Thus, in column 4 we report 
the results of a specification that includes teacher effect estimates that are adjusted for teacher 
experience. Finally, there is disagreement in the literature about whether it is appropriate to 
include school or student fixed-effects in VAMs designed to estimate teacher performance so 
we report the results for models using effect estimates based on these specification in Columns 
5 and 6 respectively. 54 
There is little point in going into great detail about the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates on estimated teacher effectiveness. In all cases we see that the marginal effects on 
the VAM estimates from math and reading are not even close to being statistically significant, 
implying that effectiveness plays little or no role in determining which teachers are targeted for 
being laid off.55 
 
                                                        
52 We also might imagine a difference in the results if teachers anticipating a layoff notice exerted less effort (an 
“Ashenfelter dip”). 
53 This model is limited in that most teachers receiving a layoff notice are quite junior so have few years of 
matched data informing the estimates of effectiveness. 
54 The standard errors in the models that include school or student fixed-effects were very imprecise so we 
opted to use teacher effect estimates for these specifications that are not adjusted using Empirical Bayes 
methods. 
55 This is not surprising given that the correlation of the effect estimates are generally pretty high: the 
correlations between the various VAM specifications we use are all greater than 0.75, with the exception of the 
estimates for 2008-09 (the year of the RIF notices) and 2007-08 (the year before the RIF notices), which have a 
bivariate (intertemporal) correlation of 0.37. This correlation is consistent with year-to-year correlations of 0.3 
to 0.5 found elsewhere in the value-added literature (Goldhaber and Hansen 2010b).  
  28 
V.  Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
Our findings largely comport with what one would expect given seniority provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements. As we noted above, all of the collective bargaining agreements 
governing policy in the ten largest school districts in Washington (during the years of our study) 
mention that seniority must be used as a factor in determining layoffs and none of these 
mention teacher effectiveness at all. Given this, the surprise is that factors other than seniority 
do appear to influence which teachers are targeted for layoffs. 
 To get a more concrete sense of the extent to which various factors play into the 
targeting of teachers for layoffs, we run simulations based on the marginal effects reported in 
Table 3.56 Specifically, in Table 5, we report the expected probability of a teacher with each 
combination of endorsement area and seniority level receiving a layoff notice.57   Table 5 clearly 
demonstrates that while a teacher’s endorsement area does affect the likelihood of being laid 
off, the effect is far smaller than the influence of seniority.  For instance, we estimate the 
probability that a first-year special education teacher receives a layoff notice is 6.2 percent, 
compared to 17 percent for a first-year health/PE teacher.  This difference is significant, but it 
pales in comparison to the difference in probabilities for a first-year teacher compared to a 
teacher with 12 or more years of seniority; the estimated probability of a teacher with 12 or 
more years of seniority receiving a layoff notice is less than a quarter of a percent for every 
endorsement area.  
Next we examine the implications of using an effectiveness-based layoff as opposed to 
                                                        
56 We use the results from columns 3 and 5 of Table 3.  The choice of specification does have an impact on 
estimates of schooling variables on the likelihood of receiving a layoff notice, but very little impact on the 
magnitude of the effect of teacher seniority. 
57 For each combination of endorsement and seniority level, we do a simulation on the individual level, using 
the actual covariates for each teacher and the marginal effects from the district fixed-effect model in Table 3 to 
predict the likelihood of that teacher receiving a layoff notice if that teacher had that endorsement/seniority 
level. The average of these probabilities gives the simulated probability that a teacher with that combination of 
endorsement and seniority level would receive a layoff notice.  
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the seniority-driven system in place.  Since performance can be judged for each teacher in both 
math and reading, there is some question about how districts would balance these estimates in 
RIF decisions.  In the simulation that follows, we simulate effectiveness-based layoffs based on 
each the mean of the math VAM estimate and reading VAM estimate for each teacher.58  
Specifically, we rank teachers based on their mean value-added estimates, and in each school 
district assume that enough teachers receive RIF notices (starting with those estimated to be 
least effective) to achieve a budgetary savings that is as much or more than the amount each 
district would have saved had each teacher who actually received RIF notices in 2008-09 been 
laid off.59  
The overlap between the subgroup of teachers who actually received a RIF notice and 
the subgroup of teachers laid off in our simulation is relatively small —only 23 teachers (or 16 
percent of teachers who received a RIF notice). Moreover, since the teachers who received RIF 
notices in our simulation were more senior (and have higher salaries) than the teachers who 
actually received RIF notices by an average of approximately eight years60, the simulation results 
in far fewer layoffs: we conservatively calculate that districts would only have to layoff 132 
teachers under an effectiveness-based system in order to achieve the same budgetary savings 
they achieved with 145 RIF notices under today’s seniority-driven system, a difference of about 
10 percent of the RIFed workforce.61 
                                                        
58 This is not necessarily the most sophisticated way of generating a cross-subject estimate of teacher 
effectiveness, but we believe the simplicity of this method might be the best reflection of how districts would 
be likely to implement such a policy. 
59 In doing this calculation we are restricted to the sample of teachers for whom we can estimate value added. 
60 The average seniority of teachers who actually received RIF notices was 1.78 years, while the average 
seniority of RIFed teachers in our simulation was 9.69 years. 
61 As in our first simulation, this 10 percent estimate is very conservative because we required that districts 
achieve at least the same savings in our simulation as they did in reality.  Had we ignored districts and 
simulated effectiveness-based RIF notices across the state, only 117 teachers (20 percent fewer) needed to get 
a RIF notice.  Since 10 percent is very conservative, and 20 percent ignores the reality that layoffs occur within 
districts, the true reduction in RIFs under an effectiveness-based system is likely to be between 10 percent and 
20 percent. 
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 Figure 3 shows the kernel distribution of teacher effectiveness under the simulated 
effectiveness-based RIF versus the actual effectiveness of teachers who received RIF notices. 
Our findings are very similar to Boyd et al. (2010) in that there is a large differential between the 
two groups in average effectiveness, 20 percent of a standard deviation of student achievement 
in math and 19 percent of a standard deviation of student achievement in reading.62 These are 
EB shrunken estimates, but as Boyd et al. show, the findings are still likely to somewhat 
overstate the differential given that performance in year t+1 is likely to differ from that 
estimated in year t.63 Still, the magnitude of the differential is striking, roughly equivalent to the 
differential between students having a teacher who is at the 16th percentile of effectiveness 
rather than the 50th percentile.  And, given estimates that students in the upper elementary 
grades typically gain a standard deviation from one grade to the next (Schochet and Chiang 
2010), the differences we are detecting between RIF systems are on the order of magnitude of 2 
½  to 3 ½  months of student learning. 
 Lastly, given that there is little overlap between the samples under these different 
scenarios, we investigate the likelihood that different types of students might be 
disproportionally affected by one type of RIF system.  For the subset of teachers who can be 
linked to student-level data, we consider the characteristics of the students whose teachers 
received a RIF notice under the actual system or in our simulation.  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 
present the probability that a student in various subgroups would have his or her teacher laid-
off under the two systems.  Column 1 presents the probabilities under the actual RIF system, 
                                                        
62 These estimates are somewhat smaller than the estimate in Boyd et al. (2010) that the difference is 
0.26 standard deviations in student achievement. This is likely due, at least in part, to the fact that we are 
interested in simulating a state-wide policy/practice that operates within districts. Our findings on 
differences in effectiveness between the two different systems would have been even larger had we 
ignored district boundaries (because there are some teachers who would not be RIFed based only on 
within district comparisons, but would be based on teacher comparisons between districts). 
63 Boyd et al., for instance, show that the 26 percent of a standard deviation difference between teachers 
is reduced to 12 percent when teachers are judged in the year following a hypothetical layoff. 
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and demonstrates that the probability that students in a particular sub-group have a teacher 
who is RIFed varies considerably from one sub-group to the next.  In particular, black students 
are far more likely than to have been in a classroom of a teacher who received a RIF notice.  This 
result could be partly driven by the fact that black students are more likely to be taught by more 
junior teachers,64 but could also be driven by the racial composition of districts that gave RIF 
notices in the 2008-09 school year.65 In column 2, we repeat the calculations for the simulated 
effectiveness-based layoffs.  The effectiveness-based layoffs result in fewer RIFs, and are much 
more equitably distributed across student subgroups; black students in particular are only 
marginally more likely to have been in a classroom with a teacher who received a RIF notice 
under this system. 
Finally, we explore the student achievement consequences of the two layoff systems by 
calculating the average effectiveness of the RIFed teachers of different subgroups of students 
under the actual layoffs (column 3) and under the effectiveness-based layoffs (column 4).  The 
differences are similar across all subgroups, as teachers RIFed in our simulation are 
approximately 20 percent of a standard deviation in student performance less effective than 
teachers RIFed in reality.   
 Our findings are not terribly surprising to anyone who is familiar with seniority 
provisions in collective bargaining agreements: seniority clearly matters for teacher job security. 
In fact, while our results show that districts are protecting teachers in high-needs areas, the 
simulations illustrate that having more seniority in a district is far more important than having 
an endorsement in a hard to recruit or retain area. 
                                                        
64 Specifically, the average white student in Washington has a teacher who is one year more senior than the 
teacher of an average black student. 
65 For example, the likelihood of a Hispanic student’s teacher receiving a RIF notice is much lower than the 
other groups under both layoff systems.  This is because (as discussed in the previous section) many districts 
with a high proportion of Hispanic students did not give any RIF notices, so no teachers in these districts 
received RIF notices in our simulation either. 
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The simulations of using an effectiveness-based system versus seniority-driven system 
clearly show that these two systems would result in a very different distribution of teachers 
targeted for layoffs and layoffs that impact different segments of the student population.  
Further, the differences in the estimated effectiveness of teachers laid off under each type of 
system would have consequential effects on student achievement, as evidenced by the 
significant difference in the effectiveness of teachers laid off under the two systems. Districts 
have not had to face the prospect of widespread teacher layoffs until recently, so the fact that 
seniority layoff provisions exist in most CBAs used to be irrelevant. This is clearly not the case 
today, nor is it likely to be the case in the near future as school systems wrestle with tighter 
budgets. 
Districts across the country are now re-thinking layoff strategies.  This is sensible for 
while the simplicity and transparency of a seniority-based system certainly has advantages, it is 
hard to argue that it is a system in the best interest of student achievement. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.  Percent of RIF Teachers by Experience (state) and Seniority (district) 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of RIF Teacher Effectiveness 
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Figure 3. Actual RIFs vs. Simulated Effectiveness-Based RIFs 
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Selected Summary statistics for RIF and non-RIF teachers in WA in 2008-09 
 RIF No RIF 
Panel 1: All Teachers in Sample N = 1717 N = 53,939 
Teacher Characteristics Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Final salary $42,826 ($11,194) $57,898 ($14,705) 
Years of experience in state 3.43 (5.16) 13.66 (9.65) 
Years of seniority in district 1.68 (3.26) 9.93 (8.44) 
Master’s degree or higher 44.32% 64.15% 
Most Recent Endorsement Area66   
“High-Needs Area” 13.33% 15.10% 
Math 3.55% 3.09% 
Science 4.95% 5.12% 
English/LA 13.45% 12.40% 
Social Studies 7.63% 10.70% 
Elementary Ed 45.60% 37.46% 
Special Ed 4.83% 6.89% 
Health/PE 4.02% 4.42% 
Agriculture/Tech/Other 6.23% 8.87% 
Arts 6.99% 5.25% 
Foreign Languages 1.69% 2.42% 
School Characteristics   
% Urban 11.07% 14.96% 
School size 707.00 (469.22) 747.30 (519.07) 
Student/teacher ratio 17.01 (3.28) 17.11 (4.22) 
% free/reduced lunch 39.64% 42.08% 
% white students 68.30% 64.00% 
% black students 5.81% 5.60% 
% Hispanic students 10.45% 15.84% 
% other races 15.44% 14.56% 
% special education 12.53% 12.40% 
% passed English WASL 72.59% 72.54% 
% passed Math WASL 51.70% 51.75% 
Panel 2: VAM sub-sample N = 145 N = 6400 
Classroom Characteristics67   
% free/reduced lunch 45.91% 44.20% 
% white students 64.81% 64.41% 
% black students 8.00% 5.52% 
% Hispanic students 12.48% 16.30% 
% other races 14.71% 13.77% 
% special education 11.57% 11.76% 
% passed English WASL 68.41% 72.00% 
% passed Math WASL 48.19% 54.88% 
Average Teacher Value-Added68   
Value-added in reading (in student SDs) -0.048 (0.17) 0.0013 (0.18) 
Value-added in math (in student SDs) -0.054 (0.17) 0.00049 (0.19) 
                                                        
66 For ease of comparison we only present statistics for a teacher’s most recent endorsement area. 
67 Classroom statistics are from the most recent year we can calculate that teacher’s value-added. 
68 The VAM estimates pooled across all years of data and shrunken by EB methods. 
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Table 1A. Distribution of Seniority of Washington Teachers by Most Recent Credential:  
                  2008-09 
 
Most Recent Endorsement Area Mean 10th 
percentile 
25th 
percentile 
Median 
“High-Needs Area” 8.55 0.00 2.00 6.00 
Math 7.05 0.00 1.00 4.00 
Science 9.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 
English/LA 9.56 1.00 3.00 8.00 
Social Studies 12.60 1.00 4.00 10.00 
Elementary Ed 7.86 1.00 2.00 6.00 
Special Ed 8.89 0.00 2.00 6.00 
Health/PE 12.56 1.00 5.00 11.00 
Agriculture/Tech/Other 11.79 1.00 4.00 10.00 
Arts 10.42 1.00 3.00 8.00 
Foreign Languages 9.83 1.00 3.00 8.00 
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Table 2. Estimated Marginal Effects on Probability of Receiving RIF Notice  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Teacher Variables 
Seniority in district -0.0065*** 
(t = -36.13) 
-0.0063*** 
(t = -36.53) 
-0.0061*** 
(t = -35.22) 
-0.0060*** 
(t = -34.99) 
-0.0079*** 
(t = -37.88) 
Master’s degree or 
higher 
-0.0065*** 
(t = -7.67) 
-0.0063*** 
(t = -7.73) 
-0.0050*** 
(t = -6.05) 
-0.0057*** 
(t = -6.99) 
-0.0071*** 
(t = -7.64) 
Endorsement Area Reference category is Elementary Education 
Most recent All endorsements  
“High-Needs Area” -0.0066*** 
(t = -5.52) 
    
Math  -0.0032 
(t = -1.47) 
-0.0046* 
(t = -1.92) 
-0.0065** 
(t = -2.57) 
-0.010*** 
(t = -3.70) 
Science  -0.0033* 
(t = -1.69) 
-0.0051** 
(t = -2.29) 
-0.0076*** 
(t = -3.21) 
-0.0094*** 
(t = -3.60) 
English/LA  0.0011 
(t = 0.85) 
0.0017 
(t = 1.04) 
-0.000054 
(t = -0.03) 
0.00049 
(t = 0.24) 
Social Studies  0.0000 
(t = 0.00) 
0.0019 
(t = 0.97) 
0.00038 
(t = 0.19) 
0.0013 
(t = 0.55) 
Special Ed  -0.0088*** 
(t = -4.69) 
-0.010*** 
(t = -4.55) 
-0.012*** 
(t = -5.37) 
-0.016*** 
(t = -6.12) 
Health/PE  0.0069*** 
(t = 3.31) 
0.0096*** 
(t = 4.26) 
0.0078*** 
(t = 3.46) 
0.0085*** 
(t = 3.27) 
Agriculture/Tech/ 
Other 
 -0.00056 
(t = 0.33) 
-0.0011 
(t = -0.50) 
-0.0032 
(t = -1.43) 
-0.0050* 
(t = -1.89) 
Arts  0.0066*** 
(t = 3.94) 
0.0067*** 
(t = 3.79) 
0.0049*** 
(t = 2.71) 
0.0044** 
(t = 2.13) 
Languages  -0.0033 
(t = -1.12) 
0.00066 
(t = 0.19) 
-0.0026 
(t = -0.74) 
-0.0036 
(t = -0.92) 
Math * add’l 
endorsements 
  -0.00020 
(t = -0.09) 
-0.00021 
(t = -0.09) 
0.0027 
(t = 1.06) 
Science * add’l 
endorsements 
  -0.00029 
(t = -0.13) 
-0.00011 
(t = -0.05) 
0.00038 
(t = 0.22) 
Engl./LA * add’l 
endorsements 
  -0.0026* 
(t = -1.76) 
-0.0017 
(t = -1.12) 
-0.0027 
(t = -1.55) 
Social Stu. * add’l 
endorsements 
  -0.0047*** 
(t = -2.71) 
-0.0049*** 
(t = -2.84) 
-0.0058*** 
(t = -2.95) 
Special Ed * add’l 
endorsements 
  --0.0026 
(t = -1.31) 
-0.0020 
(t = -1.02) 
-0.0024 
(t = -1.06) 
Health/PE * add’l 
endorsements 
  -0.013*** 
(t  = -4.58) 
-0.012*** 
(t = -4.35) 
-0.012*** 
(t = 4.10) 
Ag/Tech * add’l 
endorsements 
  0.00045 
(t = 0.24) 
0.0012 
(t = 0.64) 
0.000012 
(t = 0.00) 
Arts * add’l 
endorsements 
  -0.0056*** 
(t = -2.77) 
-0.0055*** 
(t = -2.74) 
-0.0070*** 
(t = -3.04) 
Languages * add’l 
endorsements 
  -0.0041 
(t = -1.43) 
-0.0018 
(t = -0.64) 
-0.0021 
(t = -0.66) 
School Variables None None None Covariates Covariates 
District Variables None None None Covariates Fixed-effect 
Note: Models combine both years of RIFs with year fixed-effect (55,656 teachers in 08-09 with 1717 RIFs, 
54,996 teachers in 09-10 with 407 RIFs).  All specifications also include college selectivity, female dummy, 
and non-white dummy. Marginal effects of school covariates (size, level, student/teacher ratio, racial 
composition, percent passing state exams, and urbanicity) and district covariates (size, per pupil 
expenditures, and funding sources) not shown.
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Table 3. Estimated Marginal Effects on Probability of Receiving RIF Notice: Non-Linear Effects 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Teacher Variables: Reference category is teachers with 12+ years seniority 
0–1 years seniority 0.074*** 
(t = 27.32) 
0.074*** 
(t = 27.26) 
0.092*** 
(t = 30.28) 
0.074*** 
(t = 27.23) 
0.092*** 
(t = 30.30) 
1–2 years seniority 
 
0.071*** 
(t = 25.97) 
0.069*** 
(t = 25.54) 
0.083*** 
(t = 27.21) 
0.069*** 
(t = 25.47) 
0.083*** 
(t = 27.24) 
2–3 years seniority 
 
0.060*** 
(t = 21.44) 
0.058*** 
(t = 20.93) 
0.068*** 
(t = 21.88) 
0.059*** 
(t = 20.92) 
0.069*** 
(t = 21.90) 
3–4 years seniority 
 
0.053*** 
(t = 18.10) 
0.051*** 
(t = 17.59) 
0.060*** 
(t = 18.35) 
0.051*** 
(t = 17.60) 
0.060*** 
(t = 18.37) 
4–6 years seniority 
 
0.037*** 
(t = 12.39) 
0.036*** 
(t = 12.17) 
0.040*** 
(t = 12.45) 
0.036*** 
(t = 12.21) 
0.040*** 
(t = 12.46) 
7–11 years 
seniority 
0.018*** 
(t = 5.34) 
0.017*** 
(t = 5.19) 
0.019*** 
(t = 5.29) 
0.017*** 
(t = 5.30) 
0.019*** 
(t = 5.32) 
Master’s degree 
or higher 
-0.0042*** 
(t = -5.13) 
-0.0050*** 
(t = -6.15) 
-0.0068*** 
(t = 7.21) 
-0.0049*** 
(t = -5.92) 
-0.0067*** 
(t = 7.09) 
School Percent Minority Students (by quintile in state): 1st (lowest) Quintile is reference 
2nd Quintile 
 
 0.0021 
(t = 1.05) 
-0.0067** 
(t = -2.18) 
  
3rd Quintile 
 
 0.0012 
(t = 0.60) 
-0.0034 
(t = -1.04) 
  
4th Quintile 
 
 -0.0045** 
(t = -2.20) 
-0.0025 
(t = -0.71) 
  
5th Quintile 
(highest) 
 -0.014*** 
(t = -6.47) 
0.0030 
(t = 0.74) 
  
School Percent Free/Reduced Meal Participation (by quintile in state): 1st Quintile is reference 
2nd Quintile 
 
   0.0037** 
(t = 2.20) 
0.0032 
(t = 1.16) 
3rd Quintile 
 
   0.0042** 
(t = 2.23) 
0.0024 
(t = 0.77) 
4th Quintile 
 
   -0.0011 
(t = -0.52) 
-0.00086 
(t = -0.25) 
5th Quintile 
 
   -0.0076*** 
(t = -3.04) 
-0.0017 
(t = -0.43) 
School Variables None Covariates Covariates Covariates Covariates 
District Variables None Covariates Fixed-effect Covariates Fixed-effect 
Note: Models combine 2008-09 and 2009-10 RIF notices with year fixed-effect (55,656 teachers in 08-09 
with 1717 RIFs, 54,996 teachers in 09-10 with 407 RIFs). All specifications also include college selectivity, 
female dummy, non-white dummy, and all teacher endorsement areas. Marginal effects of school 
covariates (size, level, student/teacher ratio, racial composition, percent passing state exams, and 
urbanicity) and district covariates (size, per pupil expenditures, and funding sources) not shown.  Models 
are estimated separately for Percent Minority and Percent Free/Reduced Meal Participation due to high 
bivariate correlation (0.72). 
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Table 4. Estimated Marginal Effects on Probability of Receiving a RIF Notice, Including Teacher  
Effectiveness Estimates 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Full Model       
Seniority -0.015*** 
(t = -7.44) 
-0.0057*** 
(t = -7.15) 
-
0.0085*** 
(t = -9.65) 
-
0.0084*** 
(t = -9.62) 
-
0.0085*** 
(t = -9.66) 
-
0.0086*** 
(t = -9.58) 
Math value-added -0.0024 
(t = -1.19) 
-0.0025 
(t = -1.08) 
-0.0026 
(t = -1.25) 
-0.015 
(t = -1.36) 
-0.0059 
(t = -0.71) 
0.00016 
(t = 0.04) 
Reading value-added -0.0018 
(t = -0.93) 
-0.00042 
(t = -0.18) 
-0.0022 
(t = -1.08) 
-0.016 
(t = -1.35) 
-0.0076 
(t = -0.93) 
-0.010 
(t = -1.40) 
District F.E. Model       
Seniority -0.028*** 
(t = -7.07) 
-0.018*** 
(t = -7.21) 
-0.019*** 
(t = -9.53) 
-0.018*** 
(t = -9.50) 
-0.018*** 
(t = -9.54) 
-0.018*** 
(t = -9.39) 
Math value-added -0.0030 
(t = -0.43) 
-0.0029 
(t = -0.64) 
-0.0013 
(t = -0.35) 
-0.012 
(t = -0.61) 
0.0031 
(t = 0.21) 
-0.0066 
(t = -0.93) 
Reading value-added 0.012 
(t = 1.56) 
0.0056 
(t = 1.39) 
0.0018 
(t = 0.51) 
-0.0034 
(t = -0.17) 
-0.0090 
(t = -0.67) 
-0.0058 
(t = -0.49) 
*Full models also include teacher covariates (college selectivity, master’s degree, gender, and race), 
school covariates (size, student/teacher ratio, racial composition, and urbanicity), and district covariates 
(size, per-pupil expenditure, and funding sources). District fixed-effect models include the teacher and 
school covariates above and a district fixed-effect. The regressions in each column use a different 
specification of the VAM model, described below: 
 
1: Single-year VAM estimate from year of RIF notices (08-09) (N = 2611, 88 RIF teachers) 
 
2: Single-year VAM estimate from year before RIF notices (07-08) (N = 4728, 86 RIF teachers) 
 
3: Pooled-year VAM estimate across all three years of data (06-09) (N = 6545, 145 RIF teachers) 
 
4: Pooled-year VAM estimate, controlling for experience (06-09) (N = 6545, 145 RIF teachers) 
 
5: Pooled-year VAM estimate, including school fixed-effect (06-09) (N = 6545, 145 RIF teachers) 
 
6: Pooled-year VAM estimate, including student fixed-effect (06-09) (N = 6545, 145 RIF teachers) 
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Table 5. Simulated Probability of Receiving a RIF Notice 
 
 Years of Seniority 
0–1 1–2 2–3 3–4 4–6 6–12 12+ 
En
d
o
rs
em
en
t 
A
re
a 
Math 9.3% 7.0% 3.7% 2.4% 0.95% 0.31% 0.11% 
Science 9.1% 6.9% 3.6% 2.4% 0.93% 0.31% 0.11% 
English/LA 13% 10% 5.4% 3.6% 1.4% 0.47% 0.17% 
Social Studies 13% 9.7% 5.2% 3.4% 1.4% 0.44% 0.16% 
Elementary Ed 10% 7.8% 4.2% 2.7% 1.1% 0.36% 0.13% 
Special Ed 6.2% 4.7% 2.4% 1.6% 0.62% 0.20% 0.074% 
Health/PE 17% 13% 7.4% 4.9% 2.0% 0.65% 0.24% 
Agriculture/Tech/Other 11% 8.1% 4.3% 2.8% 1.1% 0.37% 0.13% 
Arts 15% 12% 6.4% 4.3% 1.7% 0.56% 0.21% 
Foreign Languages 12% 9.2% 4.9% 3.2% 1.3% 0.42% 0.15% 
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Table 6. Probability of a Student’s Teacher Receiving a RIF Notice 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 Probability of 
RIF (actual) 
Probability of 
RIF (simulated) 
Average VAM 
(actual RIF 
teachers) 
Average VAM 
(simulated RIF 
teachers) 
All students 2.41% 2.20% -0.0487 
(0.136) 
-0.241 
(0.0757) 
White students  2.40% 2.31% -0.0410 
(0.130) 
-0.238 
(0.0769) 
Non-white 
students 
2.42% 2.00% -0.0632 
(0.145) 
-0.248 
(0.0727) 
Black students 3.77% 2.81% -0.0559 
(0.141) 
-0.244 
(0.0654) 
Hispanic students 1.86% 1.54% -0.0800 
(0.161) 
-0.263 
(0.0760) 
Low-income 
students 
2.59% 2.28% -0.0526 
(0.144) 
-0.250 
(0.0740) 
*Standard deviations in parentheses. All VAM estimates are the mean pooled-year VAM estimate used for 
the VAM simulations.  N = 143,005 students; 93,116 white, 7958 black, 22,462 Hispanic, 62,114 low 
income 
  
 
 
  
 

